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Much recent discussion in computing journals
has been devoted to arguments about the feasibil-
ity and usefulness of formal verification methods
for increasing confidence in computer programs.
Too little attention has been given to precise
criticism of specific proposed systems for reason-
ing about programs. Whether such systems are to
be used for formal verification, by hand or
automatically, or as a rigorolls foundation for
informal reasoning, it is essential that they be
logically sound. Several popular rules in the
Hoare language are in fact not sound. These rules
have been accepted because they have not been sub-
jected to sufficiently strong standards of
correctness. This paper attempts to clarify the
different technical definitions of correctness of
a logic, to show that only the strongest of these




correct some of the unsound rules which have
appeared in the literature. The corrected rules
are given merely to show that it is possible to do
so. Convenient and elegant rules for reasoning
about certain programming constructs will probably.
require a more flexible notation than Hoare's.
Key words and phrases: verification, soundness,
partial correctness, defined functi.ons, Gato,
logic.
CR categories: 5.21, 5.24, 4.29.
1. Introduction
Logic is the study of the relation between a symbolic
language and its meaning, with special emphasis on the legi-
timate ways of reasoning in the language. A primary .accom-
plishment of Mathematical Logic in the earlier part of this
century was the formalization of the First Order Predicate
Calculus, a logical language which is generally regarded as
sufficient in principle for nearly all mathematical
discourse. Formal rules for reasoning in the First order
Predicate Calculus have been shown to be correct and power-
ful enough to derive all true theorems of this language. In
the last decade, new languages and formal rules for reason-
ing about programs have been proposed, and attempts h.ave
been made to justify the correctness of these rules.
A particularly popular language for reasoning about
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programs is the language of Hoare triples (13). The Hoare
language includes the formulae of the First Order Predicate
Calculus, plus triples of the form A{P}B, with A and B
Predicate Calculus formulae and P a program or part of a
program. Such a triple is intended to mean that, if the
initial state of a machine satisfies the assertion A, then
after running the program P, B must be true of the final
state. Unfortunately, several different definitions of the
correctness of a system of reasoning, which are equivalent
for the Predicate Calculus, are not equivalent for the Hoare
language. So we must be very careful when studying rules
for reasoning in the Hoare language to use a criterion for
correctness which corresponds to our intuitive idea of legi-
timate reasoning. Several articles on Hoare logic in the
past few years [6,16,19] have attempted to justify rules of
reasoning by criteria which are insufficient to give intui-
tive confidence in the derivations which are carried out by
such rules.
There are three main reasons for using a formal presen-
tation of logic instead of relying solely on intuition when
reading and writing technical arguments:
[1] A formal presentation provides a uniform standard which
may be used as a final authority in disagreements.
[2) Formal presentation makes a system of reasoning into a





[3] A formally presented system may be processed automati-
cally by computers.
To be useful for any of these three purposes, a formal sys-
tem must be intuitively correct. A common enterprise in
logic is to formalize the notion of correctness and to prove
that a formal system is correct. Along with such a proof, a
careful intuitive inspection of the formal definition of
correctness is essential, since everything hinges o~ this
definition. Such careful scrutiny has generally been omit-
ted in published work on Hoare logics. The purpose of this
paper is to begin such a scrutiny. I will show that several
proposed .rules for reasoning abo"ut programs have been judged
by faulty standards of correctness, and are in fact
incorrect by the proper standards.
Section 2 describes four different technical defini-
tions of correctness and argues that only the strongest of
these definitions is intuitively sufficient. Section 3
introduces the Hoare language and its meaning. Section 4
shows the well-known correct rules for reasoning about pro-
grams with assignments, conditionals and while loops. Sec-
.tion 4 extends the rules to handle programs wi th function
definitions. The first two published attempts to give rules
for function definitions [6,16,19] were incorrect. Section
5 discusses the problems of reasoning about programs with
Goto commands. The best-known rule for reasoning about
Gotos [6] is also incorrect, although it satisfies a weaker
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condition which is sometimes mistaken for correctness.
2. Criteria for correctness of a logical system
Two primary requirements are known for the correctness
of a system of reasoning, each with several variations in
its technical definitions. Consistency refers to the ina-
bility of a system to derive an explicit contradiction,
while the stronger notion of soundness says that everything
derived in a system is in some sense true. There are two
natural definitions of consistency.
Definitions
Assume that a relation contradic,tory(iP) has been
defined on fini·te se'ts iP of formulae in a language so
that contradictory(iP) captures -the in'tuitive -notion
that the formulae in ifl are ,explicitly contradictory.
A system of reasoning is strongly consistent if it is
not possible to prove all of the formulae in a set ~
such that contradictory{~)•
A system of reasoning is weakly consistent if it is not
possible to prove a single formula F such that
contradictory({F}) .
Strong consistency certainly implies weak consistency.
In the First Order Predicate Calculus, contradictory{~)
holds whenever .p contains t\V'o formulae of the forms F and ....,F
April 9, 1980
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ot" a single formula of the form (F&....,.F), or the formula
False. Other sets of formulae may be taken as contradictory
as long as it is obviously impossible for all formulae in
the set to be true. Since (F&....,.F) (equivalently, False) is
provable if and only if F is provable and ....,.F is provable,
weak and strong consistency are equivalent for the First
Order Predicate Calculus with the definition of
contradictory above, or with any reasonable more liberal
definition. But in Hoare logics, two formulae A{~JB and
C{QJD cannot be combined with a symbol like &. So weak and
strong consistency might not be equivalent for systems of
reasoning in Hoare languages. 1 show in Section 5 that a"
system proposed by Musser [16,19} for reasoning about func-
tion definitions in Euclid is weakly consistent but not
strongly consistent. The proposed system violate~ the prin-
ciple that (F&,F) is provable if and only if F and ,F are
each provable.
Strong consistency, for some reasonable definition of
contradictory, is intuitively a necessary condition for the
correctness of a logical system, but it is not in general a
sufficient condition, since a system might prove a formula
which is false but does not contradict any other provable
formula.
Definitions
A set of formulae ~ implies a formula F if F is true in
every world in which all the formulae in ~ are true.
- 7 -
A logical system is theorem sound if every provable
formula is true.
A logical system is inferentially sound if, for every
set of formulae ip and every formula F, if F can be
proved from assumptions in ip, then ip implies F.
In any system where contradictory formulae cannot all be
true I theorem soundness impl ies strong consistency. If, in
addition, there exists a trivially true formula F which can-
not possibly be useful as an assumption (for example, F
might already be an axiom) then inferential soundness
implies theorem soundness.
In the First Order Predicate calculus, F is provable





} of ip such that ((FI & ••• & Po) => F}
is provable with no assumptions. Since the meaning of the
implication symbol is just that the left side implies the
right side, theorem and inferential soundness are equivalent
for the First Order Predicate Calculus. In Hoare logics, it
is not always possible to join two formulae with an implica-
tion sign, so theorem soundness may be weaker than inferen-
tial soundness.
Al though theorem soundness seems at first glance to be
enough for an intuitive claim of correctness, this weaker
form of soundness only justifies the theorems of a system,
not the methods of reasoning. If a formal system is to pro-
April 9, 1980
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vide a satisfactory foundation for actual reasoning, the
methods of proof should be intuitively correct, not just
symbol manipulation tricks which fortuitously produce true
theor~ms at the end. One might argue that certain rules for
program verification are intended only for automatic theorem
proving, not for human consumption, so that the steps of
reasoning are not important as long as the answer is right.
Even from such a restricted point of view, theorem soundness
is at best not a very robust notion.
Suppose that a certain logical system is incomplete, so
that some particular true formula F cannot be proved. Such
a system might be theorem sound, even though assuming F
would lead to a proof of some false or even contradictory
formula G. Any attempt to extend this system by adding true
formulae as axioms or by providing additional correct rules
of inference would be very dangerous, since once the true
formula F became provable, so would the false formula G. In
Section 6 I show that the rules for reasoning about Goto
commands proposed by Clint and Hoare [6] create a system of
reasoning with this dangerous property: because of the lack
of inferential soundness, addition of true axioms yields an
inconsistency. Arbib and Alagi~ [1,3] also noticed a prob-
lem with the Clint and Hoare Goto rule. In inferentially
sound systems every step of reasoning is correct, so sound-
ness is preserved when additional true axioms or additional
sound rules are added.
ll.nr; 1 Q lql=!.n
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3. Meanings of formulae in Hoare logics
Recall that a Hoare formula is either a formula of the
First Order Predicate Calculus or a triple A{P}B with A and
B formulae of the Predicate Calculus and P a program or pro-
gram segment (some people prefer to write (AlpIB}). Predi-
cate Calculus formulae are built from function, constant and
variable symbols, relational symbols, the equality sign, and
the usual logical symbols & (and), V (or), """1 (not), =>
(implies), V x (for all x) and:>Ix (there exists x). For
example,
\lx:;Yy (y>x & primeCY»
is a Predicate Calculus formula expressing the fact that
there exist arbitrarily large primes. Such formulae have
the standard meanings, which correspond exactly to the
intuition; see [18] for a formal treatment.
Great effort has gone into formalizing the meanings of
programs [22,11], but for this discussion I will use only
programs whose meanings are intuitively obvious. There are
two popular ways to define the meaning of a Hoare triple
A{P}B, which differ in their treatments of cases where P
fails to halt.
Definitions
A Hoare triple A{P}B is a true partial correctness for-
mula if, whenever the program segment P begins execu-
April 9, 1980
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tion wi th its fi.cst command, in a state for which A is
true, and p terminates normally by executing its last
command, then B is true of the resulting final state.
A{P}B is a true total correctness formula if, whenever
P begins execution with its first command, in a state
for which A is true, then p terminates normally QY exe-
cuting its last command, and B is true of the resulting
final state.
For example,
A{While True do x:=x end}B
is always a true partial correctness formula, independently
of A and B. Partial correctness formulae make no distinc-
tion between failure to terminate and abnormal or unsuccess-
ful termination due to an error such as division by zero.
The formula above is a false total correctness formula as
long as there exists a state for which A is true. False{P}B
is a true formula for both partial and total correctness.
If P always halts when started in a state for which A is
true, then the partial and total correctness meanings for
A{P} B are the same. For example,
x>O&y>O{z:=l; i:=O; While i<y do z:=z*x: i:=i+l end}z=x Y
correctness,total
the program inside the
To achieve machine
is a true formula for both partial and
roughly expressing the fact that
braces computes x to the y power.
- 11 -
independence, programs in Hoare formulae are assumed to be
executed on an ideal machine with an arbitrarily large
memory capacity, so that there are no overflows.
The partial correctness meaning for Hoare triples is
more popular than the total correctness meaning because it
is thought to be easier to deal with in formal proofs. Of
course a partial correctness proof for a program is only
valuable if we convince ourselves by some other means that
the program halts. In the rest of this discussion, Hoare
triples will always be interpreted as partial correctness











contradictory. Also, if Y is a contradictory set of Predi-
cate Calculus formulae, and P is a well-formed program
which obviously halts (e.g., a program with no loops), and
if ~ contains all the formulae True{p)A for A in Y, then ~
is contradictory. Any additional intuitively contradictory
sets of formulae may be added to the definition of
contradictory(~) without affecting the following discussion.
4. Proof rules for programs with conditional and while
Consider a programming language with simple assignments
x := E




which does nothing, a command
Fail
which never terminates normally,
of the form
If A then P else Q end,
and loops of the form





Commands may be sequenced in the Pascal style with semicolon
separators. Of course, Null and Fail are not needed, but
they are convenient for discussion.
Assume that we have taken some sufficiently powerful
proof rules from Mathematical Logic for all of our predicate
Calculus reasoning. In order to prove theorems i,n the form
A{p}B we need additional rules for reasoning about p'rograms.





and G are schematic descriptions of formu-
meaning of such a rule is that, whenever the
F
l
, ••. , F
n
have already been proved, we may
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prove the conclusion G in one more step. Sometimes restric-
tions are also given which limit the allowed applications of
the rule. A rule with no hypotheses is often called an
axiom or postulate.
The following well-known set of proof rules [13} is
inferentially sound [B} for partial correctness Hoare logic






In the next rule note that A(E/x) means A with the expres-
sion E replacing all free occurrences of x. A variable
occurrence x is free as long as it is not in a subformula
beginning with Vx or :'Ix. In the process of replacing x by
E, quantified variables in Vy and 3Y within A must be
renamed so that all variables in E remain free after substi-
tution.
Ass ig nment: -------------















To see that these rules are inferentially sound, we merely
check each rule individually to see that whenever the
hypotheses are true, the conclusion must also be true.
Since combinations of inferentially sound systems are
inferentially sound, we need not consider the possible
interactions between rules. Cook fa] has shown that these
rules are sufficiently powerful to prove all true statements
in the Hoare language of conditionaf-while programs.
5. Defined functions
Let us add to the conditional-while
programming
language the ability to define functions by means of subpro-
grams. For simplicity, consider only recursion-free (i.e.,
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noncircular) definitions of unary functions, with no nesting
of definitions, no side-effects and no global variables.
Such a simple version of function definitions already pro~
vides interesting pitfalls for Hoare logic.
itions will be written in the form
Function defin,.,..
E: Function(x)i local zl, .•• ,zn; Pi return(y) ~
n may be 0, in which case there are no localabIes in P.
must be distinct and must contain all vari-
variables, and the phrase local zl"'.'zo; is omitted. The
form return(y) must occur exactly once, at the end, and
should be thought of as a punctuation like Function(x)
rather than a command. The value of x must not be changed
in P. Any changes to the val ues of y,Zl,·",zn
wi thin p
have no effect on the values of these variables o~tside of
the function definition.




where f has been defined as




B do not contain
free.
Ashcroft [4] noticed that adding the rule Function-l to
those of section 4 yields an inconsistency.
defined as
l\pril 9, 1980
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(*) f: Function(x); Fail; return(y) end.







So, the system containing Function-l is not even weakly con-
sistent.
It may appear that Function-l only derives contradic-
tions from pathological function definitions which never
halt. A similar contradiction arises whenever a defined
function fails to halt for some possible argument, even if
the value of the function is never computed for that .argu-
ment. For example, it is very natural to define the fac-
torial function by a program which works correctly for posi-
tive arguments, but computes forever on negative arguments.
The presence of such a definition leads to a contradiction
even if factorial is only computed for positive arguments.
Alagit and Arbib [11 present the rule Function-l with
an informal warning that the function body must halt when A
is true initially. For a logical rule to be useful, we must
be able to decide when the rule has been applied correctly.
AlagiG and Arbib's restriction, taken literally, cannot be
formalized in an acceptable fashion, since the halting of P
is undecidable. One reasonable way to fix the rule
,...·,_.1 a 10Rn
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Function-l with such a restriction is to provide means for
proving termination, that is, to use a total correctness
logic instead of partial correctness. Alternatively, the
rule could be restricted to some decidable proper subset of
the set of all function bodies which halt.
in disguise. Russell's paradox
The inconsistency
Russell's paradox (21]
in Function-l is essentially
arises from the definition of a set R as the set of all sets
which do not contain themselves. Does R contain itself? A
set may be represented by a function, called the charac-
teristic function, which returns 1 for inputs in the set and
o for inputs not in the set. Russell's set R is represented
-by the defined function
r: Function(g) ~ y:=l-g(g); return(y)~ end
Now, the following derivation mimics Russell's paradox:
1) 1-9(g)=1-g(g){y,=1-g(g)}y=1-9(9) Assignment
2) True =) 1-g(g)=I-g(g) Predicate Calc u1 us
3) y=l-g(g) => y;'g(g) Ad thmetic
4) T<ue{y,=1-g(g»y;'g(g) Consequence, 1),2),3)
5) Vg (True => «g);'g(g) ) Function-I, 4)
6) «r);'«r) Predicate Calculus, 5)
Musser (16,19] proposed a modified function rule in
Euclid notation. Musser's basic idea is that the paradox of
Function-l arises when formulae A and 8 are chosen in such a
April 9, 1980
- 18 -
way that there does not exist a function f satisfying
Vx(A=>B(f(x)/y)). The existence of such a function may
easily be expressed in the First Order Predicate Calculus as
Vx(A=):[yB). To avoid the extra step of substituting various
values for x, Musser includes the substitution in his rule.
Musser's rule covers recursion, a form of data abstraction,
and more complicated uses of parameters, but, for my res-
tricted function definitions, the rule is essentially
Function-2:
3y{A{E/x) => B{E/x», A{P}B
---------------------------
(A(E/x) => B(E/x,f{E)/y))
where f has been defined as
f:Function(x) ~ local zl'···'z ;
P; return(y) end n
and A and
Zl,···,zn
B do not contain
free.
This rule may be applied
with only one choice
of A and B for each
function definition.
The additional hypothesis 3y(A(E/X)=>B(E/X,f(E)/Y)) prevents
the simple contradiction which arose from Function-I. Now
we need two proofs to derive a contradiction. Let f again
be defined by a body which never halts (*).
- 19 -
1) True{Fail} False
2) False =) y=O
3) True =) True
4) True{Fail}y=O
5) 3y(True =) y=Ol
6) True =) f(O)=O










2) False =) y"O Predicate Calculus
3) True =) True Predicate calculus
4) True{~}y~O Consequence, 1),2),3)
5) 3"y(True =) y"O) Arithmetic
6 ) True =) f(O)"O Function-2, 4) ,5)
7) f(O)"O Predicate Calculus, 6)
So, the system containing the rules of Section 4 as well as
Function-2 is not strongly consistent. It is weakly con-
sistent only because of the peculiar restriction that
Function-2 may be applied to each function for only one
choice of A and B. (Musserls rule does not express the res-
triction so explicitly. In Euclid, the Predicate Calculus
formulae A and B in A(E/x) =) B(E/x,F(E)/y) must be included
in the function definition, so the single allowed applica-




A strongly consistent system may be achieved through
the following rule. The trick is to allow assertions about
expressions feE) only after feE) has been computed within an
expression G[f(E)}. So, if f (El is undefined, any attempt
to compute G[f(E)] fails, and all partial correctness formu-
lae about z:=G[f(E)] are true. If the expression E does not
contain the variable z, the following rule may be used for
reasoning about defined functions:
Alpla
A (E/ x) [z: =G [ f (E) J }a (E/x ,f ( E) /y)




and A and 8 do not contain
z1""'zo free,
and z does not occur .in E.
If the variable z appears in the expression E in z:=G[f(E)],
then the rule above does not work, because the assertion
B(E/x,f(E)/y) has a different meaning after the assignment
than before the assignment. The following more complicated
rule uses the substitution technique from the Assignment








where f has been defined as




B do not contain
free.
If defined functions are used in the conditions of condi-




A(E/X)&C(.!.i G[f(E)} then Q else R)D
where f has been defined as
f:Function(x); local zl, ••• ,zn;
P; return(y) end
and A and B do not contain
zl, ... ,zn free.
Function-while:
A(P)B, C&G[f(E)} (Q}C
A(E/x)&C(While G[f(El] do Q end}C&-,G[f(E)]
where f has been defined as







'I'hese three rules may be extended in a natural way to handle
April 9, 1980
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more than one defined function.
The soundness of rules for function definitions is a
slippery issue when function bodies fail, since the normal
interpretation of the Predicate Calculus does not allow for
partial functions. So, we consider a Predicate Calculus
formula containing a program-defined function f to be true
when it is true for all total functions f consistent with
the values computed by the definition of f [7]. If the
definition fails to halt, then every total function is con-
sistent with all the computed values (there are none), so
only assertions which hold for all functions, such as
Vx f{x)=f(x), are true for f. The assertion f{O)=O is only
true when the definition of f actually computes the output
value 0 on input o. Under such an interpretation,
Function-assignment, Function-conditional and Function-while
are inferentially sound.
Since the systems containing Function-lor Function-2
are not even strongly consistent, they cannot be sound.
Notice that Function-l is an inferentially sound rule under
the total correctness interpretation. For total correctness
the rules Fail and ~fuile are not sound, so alternate rules
must be used for reasoning about these constructs in a total
correctness logic [7,10).
The logical system containing the rules of Section 4
plus Function-assignment, Function-conditional and
Function-while cannot be relatively complete according to
- 23 -
Cookls [BJ definition, because there is no way to prove pro-
perties of f(x) unless f(x) is actually computed in the pro-
gram. This system is sufficient to prove all partial
correctness properties of programs which only mention values
of defined functions when those values have actually been
computed.
6. The Gato problem
Since the Hoare language is tailored to the description
of exactly two states associated with a program execution --
the normal entry and exit states it is not surprising
that trouble arises in considering program segments with
more than one mode of entry and/or exit. Such multiple
entry and exit segments occur when the Gato command is used.
It is not obvious how to interpret A{P}B when P may ter-
minate by executing ~ 1, with the label 1 occurring out-
side of P. The usual solution, proposed by Donahue [11], is
to regard such termination as abnormal. So
True{Goto l}False is a true partial correctness formula,
and, by itself, Goto 1 is indistinguishable from Fail.
Under this interpretation, the Composition-l rule is
unsound. For example, True{Goto l}False and
False{l: Null}False are true hypotheses for Composition-I,
but the associated conclusion True{Goto 1; 1: Null}False is
false, since Goto 1; 1: Null is equivalent to Null. No
system containing Composition-l may be inferentially sound
for reasoning about programs with Gotos. In [II] Donahue
Apr i1 9, 1980
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places such strong restrictions on the use of Gotos that it
is syntactically impossible to have a program segment PiQ
with a jump between P and Q. Composition-l is sound for
Donahue' 5 restricted language.
Cl int and Hoare [6] proposed a rule for reasoning about
Gotos which may be combined with Composition-l in a theorem
sound system. To understand this rule, consider a program-
ming language with assignment, conditional, while loops,
sequencing and Gotos which may branch out of but not into
the scopes of conditionals and loops. without loss of gen-
erality, let all labels be attached to Null commands. The
Null rule must be expanded to allow labelled Null commands:
Null-label:
A{l: Null}A
The Clint-Hoare Gota rule is:
Goto-l:
B{Goto l)False f-A{P}B, B{Goto l)False f-B{Q}C
--------------------------------------------
AlP; 1: Null; Q}C
The following critique also applies to Kowaltowski's varia-
tion on the Cl int-Hoare Goto rule (15]. The hypothesis
B{~ l)False I-A{P}B
is intended to mean that A{P}B has been proved using
B{~ I} False as an assumption (similarly for
B(~ l)False I- B(Q}C)
- 25 -
The system of reasoning using the rules of Section 4
plus Goto-l is theorem sound. Notice that
'rruP.{~?to lJFulsc, although true, cannot be proved with
these rules, 50 Composition-l cannot be used to produce
True(Goto 1; 1: ~}False. Any extension of this system in
which True{Goto l}Palse is provable is theorem unsound, and
even inconsistent.
What about the inferential soundness of the Goto-l rule
itself? That depends on how we interpret the truth or
falsehood of
B{~ l)False r A{P}B.
If we interpret this hypothesis as true only when there is a
proof of A{P}B from B[~ I} False in the particular system
we are using, then the meaning of this rule depends on the
whole system. For example, the rule would be sound within
the clint-Hoare system, but not in a system which proves
True{~ I} PaIse. Clarke [5] uses this weak interpretation
of J- in .expressing the soundness of a rule for recursive
procedures. A more robust interpretation is that
B(~ l)False r A(P)B
is true whenever there exists an inferentially sound system
in which A{P}B may be proved assuming B{Goto l}False --
equivalently, whenever B{~ I} False implies A{P}B.
Donahue (11] uses this stronger interpretation of in his
treatment of recursive procedures. Since B{Goto l}False is
April 9, 1980
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true, the implication reduces to simply A{P}B [3]. Contrary
to Donahue's Theorem 5.15 {Ill, the Goto-l rule is certainly
not sound in the stronger interpretation, since
False[Goto l}Falsel- True{Goto l}False,
False [Go to I} False r False {Null} Fal se
are true hypotheses, yet the associated conclusion
True[Goto 1; 1: Null}False
is false. Arbib and Alagit noticed this difficulty indepen-
dently [31.
perhaps the insistence on inferential soundness and the
most liberal possible interpretation of I- seems too picky.
After all, it seems that we only need to be careful about
Gatos, which are well-known to be dangerous beasts, and
avoid introducing axioms like True{Goto l}False. Unfo r-
tunately, the rule Goto-l may yield false conclusions in the
presence of added rules or axioms which do not appear to
have anything to do with Gotos. For example, consider the
sound and intuitively attractive rule:
Zero:
True{P; x:=O}x=O











2) x=O (1: Null) x=O Null-label
3) True{x:=l; Gato 1; x:=O; 1: ~}x=O Gato-l, 1) ,2)
The correct theorem True{x:=li Gato 1; x:=Q; 1: ~}xiO is
also provable, so the system containing Goto-l and Zero is
not strongly consistent.
How may we reason correctly about Gotos? One way is to
return to the Floyd [12] style of proof, in which a proof
follows the control flow of a program. Constable and
O'Donnell [7 J have explored this idea. Manna and
Waldinger's intermittent assertions [17] also handle Gatos
easily. Even if we insist on using the Hoare language", we
may still have a sound system for reasoning about Gatos.
First, Composition-l must be replaced by:
A{P}B, B{Q}C
Compo si t ion-2: ------------
A{p;QlC
where there are no
Goto branches from
p to Q or Q to P.
To understand the rest of the rules, notice that
A(P; Fail; 1 : Nu 11 JB says that if " is true initially, and P
terminates by executing Goto 1 , then B is true of the final
sta te. Alagi6 and Arbib [ 1 , 3] express the same idea in the






A{Goto 1: Pi 1: Null}A
Gato-label-other:
A{P; Fail; 1: NulllB
-----------------------------
A{P; m: NUll; Fail; 1: Null}B
where 1 and m are different labels.
Goto-composition:
A{P; Fail; 1, Null)C, A{pIB, B{Q; Fail; 1, Null)C
-------------------------------------------------
A{P; Qj Fail; 1: Null}e
where there are no
Gato branches from
p to Q or Q to P.
Gato-conditional:
A&B{P; Fail; 1: Null}e, A&~B{Q; Fail; 1: Nuille
-----------------------------------------------
A{i! B then P else Q end; Fail; 1: ~}C
Gato-while:
Combination:
A&B{P}A, A&B{p;Fail; 1: Null}e
-----------------------------------
A{While B Do P end; Fail; 1: Null}e






Alagic' and Arbib [11 present the Goto-2, Gato-label and
Gato-while rules in a somewhat more powerful notation. They
also give the Gato-composition and Composition-l rules com-
bined into one rule, neglecting to state the restriction
that there are no jumps between P and Q. wi thout such a
restriction, the rule becomes unsound. (In private
correspondence, Arbib indicates that the rule was only
intended to apply to a restricted form of statement, called
an L_statement. Arbib and Alagic' 5 rule is sound for L-
statements. The restriction is not given explicitly in the
statement of the rule.) Combination is strengthened to
include one application of Composition-I. Gato-conditional
is omitted in [1].
The system consisting of the rules Null, Fail, Assign-
ment, Conditional and While from Section 4, along with
Null-label Composi tion-2, Goto-2, Goto-label, Goto-
composition, Goto-conditional, Goto-while and Combination
above, is inferentially sound. Cook'S techniques for prov-
ing relative completeness [8] may be used to show that this
system is sufficiently powerful to derive all true partial
correctness formulae for our simple programming language
with Gotos.
7. Summary and Conclusions
I have argued that a logical system is only correct
when it is inferentially sound, so that every intermediate
step in a proof, as well as the final result, is true
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according to some intuitively meaningful notion of truth.
Weaker correctness criteria, such as theorem soundness,
which guarantees the truth of final results, but not inter-
mediate steps, are unacceptable because they allow intui-
tively false reasoning which leads by formal tricks to true
results. A logical system which is theorem sound but not
inferentially sound is very dangerous because the addition
of true axioms may introduce an inconsistency.
Rules proposed for reasoning about defined functions
and Gotos in the Hoare style have not always met the stan-
dard of inferential soundness. Inferentially sound rules
are not hard to find, but they are unsatisfyingly inelegant.
The problem seems to be that partial correctness reasoning
in the Hoare language is very natural for programs with only
conditionals and loops for control structures, but not for
programs with defined functions and/or Gotos. Defined func-
tions tangle partial correctness and termination together to
such an extent that it is no longer convenient to separate
them. Since it is essential to prove termination anyway, we
should use total correctness logics for reasoning about
function definitions. Goto commands destroy the Hoare-style
analysis of programs by structural induction, since the
semicolon does not really indicate composition in the pres-
ence of ~s, as it does in their absence. Goto commands
are handled very naturally in the Floyd style of reasoning.
- 3'l -
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